IN his article 'One system, not four' (Jan 20), Khalid Anwar has sensed some malice behind the government's desire to transfer more subjects to the provinces by abolishing the concurrent list.

In this supposed design he suspects the hand of the federal finance ministry to reduce its future responsibilities, and the political parties to create the impression that provincial autonomy is being enhanced.

He, therefore, opposed the scheme as such, suggesting “It is still time for the political leadership to pause, reflect and retract before leading this already badly divided country further ...”

Surprisingly, before forcefully rejecting the scheme as a political disaster, he agrees that there should indubitably be more provincial autonomy.

His main thrust of arguments against the withdrawal of the concurrent list is that it will not be in the interest of good governance.

This is because the criminal law falling within the ambit of the concurrent list will no more be a concept of future anti-terrorism law and there will be no longer new nationwide accountability law.

Besides, there will be no nationwide legislation on the subjects of health etc, he further argued.

Mr Anwar, therefore, suggests that instead of abolishing the concurrent list as a whole, the federal government, in exercise of the powers under Article 146 of the Constitution, should transfer any of the functions and responsibilities falling within its purview to the provincial governments.

The arguments against abolishing the concurrent list are based on the assumption that so far none of the provinces has shown a sense of responsibility for incurring expenditures related to enhanced social welfare, provision of essential facilities to the poorest segments of the population, increased levels of efficiency, reducing levels of graft, etc.

The question is, has the federal government ever shown such a sense of responsibility in discharging these functions?

On the contrary, Pakistan, for more than half of its life, has remained in the hands of illegitimate power, i.e. martial law, which ruled the country without any regard to the aspiration of small provinces by the centre.

Moreover, the entire resources have been kept by the centre and the amounts given in the annual budget are hardly enough to meet the administrative expenditure.

The fact is that provinces have never been trusted, even for handling their own matters.

If Pakistan's federal structure is to strengthen itself, it must be based on a system where the constituent units feel fully accommodated as an equal part of the state rather than an adjunct of the federal government.

The denial of legitimate provincial rights could prove disastrous as is evident from the 1971 tragedy. The 1962 constitution was presidential, with the federation consisting of only two provinces. Yet the way it existed, in principle and in operation, created resentment in East Pakistan that ultimately led to the 1971 debacle.

We have similar problems with the 1973 Constitution, because small provinces have grievances which have at times caused serious differences.

Balochistan, the country's largest province territorially, has for decades felt aggrieved on two counts first, it feels that the quantum of provincial autonomy mentioned in the 1973 Constitution is inadequate; two, even the existing provisions relating to provincial rights are not fully implemented.

Thus in the presence of the concurrent list there is little room for the provinces to run their affairs independently and effectively.

The agreement arrived at by the Special Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms recently to abolish the Concurrent List and recommend transfer of all subjects to the provinces from the federation would, therefore, be a welcome step in the right direction.

AMANULLAH TURK
Dubai